United Nations S/2014/267

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 April 2014

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Mali

Summary

The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1960 (2010), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012). It provides information on the six grave violations against children in Mali covering the period from January 2012 to December 2013.

In his report, the Secretary-General highlights grave violations against children committed by parties to the conflict, including Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest, the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad, Ansar Dine and, to a lesser extent, the Malian Defence and Security Forces and pro-Government militias. Violations were mainly sexual violence, killing and maiming, recruitment and use of children, and attacks on schools and hospitals. Children were also detained for their alleged association with armed groups. The most affected regions were Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu.

The Secretary-General notes that the end of the conflict and the process of progressive stabilization of northern Mali contributed to a decrease in the number of grave violations recorded. He also indicates that the protection needs of children affected by the six grave violations are no longer as high as at the onset of the crisis, throughout 2012 and the first months of 2013. Despite the overall improvement in the political and security situation, however, children continue to remain vulnerable and at risk of violations, particularly in the North.

Important challenges for the monitoring and reporting of grave violations persist and information available before and after the establishment of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism remains limited.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1960 (2010), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012), provides information on the six grave violations against children in Mali covering the period from January 2012 to December 2013.

2. This is the first country-specific report on the situation of children and armed conflict in Mali, following the listing for recruitment and use of children as well as for rape and sexual violence of Ansar Dine, the Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad (MNLA) and the Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO) in annex I to my annual report on children and armed conflict in 2013 (S/2013/245). Subsequently, the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism in Mali was established under the co-chairmanship of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The first meeting of the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting was held on 8 November 2013.

3. The United Nations was able to verify only a very limited number of cases of grave violations, owing to a combination of limited capacity of the Child Protection Section of MINUSMA and severe restrictions on access to northern Mali throughout the reporting period. With the offensive launched by the separatist Tuareg movement and the successive occupation by three Islamist armed groups of the northern regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, grave violations against children were committed systematically in northern Mali, in particular throughout 2012 and early 2013.

4. The positive military and political developments that took place throughout 2013, however, contributed to a significant decrease in the violations reported. That progress notwithstanding, the security situation remained challenging in the regions of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, putting children at risk of recruitment, killing, maiming and sexual violence.

5. Information provided in the present report is drawn from a number of sources, including my previous reports to the Security Council, as well as from data collected by the humanitarian clusters.

II. Political and military developments in Mali since January 2012

6. In mid-January 2012, MNLA, supported by Islamist armed groups including Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and MUJAO, initiated a series of attacks against government forces in the north of the country. In March 2012, a mutiny by disaffected government soldiers quickly turned into a military coup d'état led by then Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who seized power and suspended the Constitution.

7. The coup d'état accelerated the collapse of the State in the North and further weakened the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, resulting in a significant number of desertions and allowing MNLA to overrun government forces in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu and unilaterally proclaim an independent "State of Azawad" on 6 April 2012. On the same day, the military junta and the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) signed a framework agreement, which included the appointment of the then Speaker of the National Assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, as interim President.

8. Meanwhile, on 26 May 2012, MNLA and Ansar Dine reportedly formed a pact whereby they announced the formation of an Islamic Republic of Azawad, with the endorsement of AQIM. The Islamist groups started imposing Sharia law and tensions emerged shortly thereafter with MNLA. Islamist armed groups consolidated their hold in the North, committing serious human rights abuses, including child recruitment, summary executions, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals and destruction of religious, historic and cultural sites. In September 2012, Ansar Dine seized the town of Douentza and crossed into central Mali.

9. By November 2012, Ansar Dine and MUJAO had driven MNLA out of the main towns of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Northern Mali was then controlled by an array of armed groups, terrorist and affiliated entities, estimated to be composed of 3,000 elements, including children, well equipped with armaments reportedly obtained from Libya and arms captured from the Malian armed forces. At that time, the towns of Douentza, Gao and Ménaka were under the control of MUJAO, which was mostly composed of foreign fighters, while AQIM was occupying Timbuktu and Tessalit, and Ansar Dine remained in control of Kidal. The Islamist police was established in Gao, Dire, Gounda and Douentza, while AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Dine supported each other's efforts in maintaining control of the occupied regions.

10. By the end of 2012, the humanitarian situation in the country had seriously deteriorated, with significant displacement, including several hundred thousand internally displaced persons (400,000 as of November 2012) and refugees who fled mainly to neighbouring Mauritania, the Niger and Burkina Faso. While serious abuses had been reported since the onset of the crisis, the pattern, prevalence and nature of grave violations worsened significantly with the consolidation of the occupation by Islamist armed groups in the North.

11. MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Dine imposed a strict interpretation of Sharia law, curtailing fundamental freedoms, imposing corporal punishments amounting to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and in some cases, carrying out summary executions.

12. On 20 December 2012, the Security Council authorized the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) by the adoption of resolution 2085 (2012), which the Council mandated AFISMA to, inter alia, support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups, and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, including AQIM and MUJAO.

13. In January 2013, the National Assembly approved a road map for the transition, calling for the restoration of territorial integrity and the organization of free and fair elections. In the same month, however, elements of Ansar Dine, MUJAO and AQIM advanced southwards, capturing the central town of Konna and prompting the Malian transitional authorities to request French intervention. On 11 January, France launched Operation Serval, and the deployment of AFISMA was accelerated. French and African forces pushed the armed groups out of the main population centres, facilitating the return of the Malian armed forces.

14. MNLA established de facto control over the Kidal region, however, and declared its opposition to the redeployment of the armed forces to Kidal. The other armed groups withdrew northwards into the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains, pursued by the French forces. Others blended into local communities. Those groups have since carried out counter-attacks and have resorted to tactics of asymmetric warfare, including the use of suicide bombings.

15. While the Security Council, by its resolution 2100 (2013) of 25 April 2013, established MINUSMA, to be effective on 1 July 2013, major French operations in the North had ended by May 2013. At the same time, negotiations with MNLA and the Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (HCUA) continued in Ouagadougou, under the auspices of the ECOWAS mediator, the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, the African Union and the United Nations. A preliminary agreement for a ceasefire, cantonment and disarmament arrangements, confidence-building measures and a follow-up dialogue process was reached on 18 June 2013 in Ouagadougou. The agreement paved the way for the gradual return of Malian security forces and civil servants to Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, which made possible the organization of the presidential elections of 28 July throughout the country.

16. Following two rounds of presidential elections in July and August 2013, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was elected President with over 70 per cent of the votes. Soon thereafter, a 34-member government was established under the leadership of the Prime Minister, Oumar Tatam Ly. The legislative elections, which were held on 24 November and 15 December, marked a second major step in the re-establishment of the constitutional order.

17. During the last quarter of 2013, parties made limited progress in pursuing discussions within the framework designed by the preliminary agreement. At the time of writing, a comprehensive agreement on the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme had not been reached. Three pilot cantonment sites, however, were established in Kidal for the signatories of the preliminary agreement, MNLA and HCUA, regrouping approximately 800 combatants. Meanwhile, terrorist armed groups continued to fight Malian and international forces: MUJAO claimed responsibility for a number of rockets launched in the Gao region in October 2013, and AQIM claimed responsibility for detonating a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device into a MINUSMA checkpoint on 4 November 2013 in Tessalit.

A. Mouvement national pour la libération de l'Azawad

18. MNLA was founded in October 2011 with the objective of creating an independent State of the Azawad, claiming grievances related to previous Tuareg rebellions and denouncing the non-respect by the Malian authorities of the Algiers Accord signed in 2006. Mostly composed of Tuaregs after the fall of Gaddafi, MNLA reportedly included elements returning from Libya, where they had been integrated into the Libyan Army following the end of the 2006-2007 Tuareg rebellion.

19. Since the beginning of the offensive in early 2012 against the Malian armed forces, MNLA has been responsible for widespread looting of State installations and for targeted attacks on southerners, rape and sexual violence, and the recruitment

and use of children and youth from local Tuareg clans (*fractions*) and relatives of MNLA cadres.

20. Since the signing of the Ouagadougou preliminary agreement on 18 June 2013, members of MNLA and HCUA have participated in the pilot cantonment projects in the Kidal region.

B. Ansar Dine

21. Ansar Dine is an armed group led by Iyad Ag Ghali, one of the most prominent leaders of the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s. Ansar Dine aims to impose strict Sharia law across Mali. From March 2012 to January 2013, members of Ansar Dine committed grave human rights violations, including the recruitment and use of children, rape and sexual violence against women and girls, killing of civilians and the destruction of world heritage sites. Ansar Dine was listed on 20 March 2013 by the Security Council Committee concerning Al-Qaida, pursuant to resolution 2083 (2012), as an entity associated with Al-Qaida. Ansar Dine received backing from AQIM in its fight against the Malian armed forces, notably in the capture of the towns of Aguelhok on 24 January 2012, Tessalit on 10 March 2012, Kidal on 30 March 2012, Gao on 30 March 2012, and Timbuktu on 1 April 2012. Ansar Dine also received financial support from AQIM. No incidents of grave violations against children attributable to Ansar Dine have been recorded since March 2013.

C. Haut Conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad

22. In May 2013, the Tuareg leader Mohamed Ag Intalla formed HCUA, rejecting the claim to an independent Northern Mali and supporting political dialogue to end the conflict. A number of Ansar Dine elements are reported to have joined HCUA, which participated in the Ouagadougou process and signed the preliminary agreement on 18 June 2013.

D. Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest

23. Resulting from a leadership struggle within AQIM, the splinter group MUJAO announced its existence by claiming the abduction of three humanitarian workers from a Saharan refugee camp in Tindouf on 23 October 2011. Since then, MUJAO co-existed and operated jointly with AQIM in the Sahel, in particular in drug trafficking and hostage-taking. MUJAO claimed responsibility for the abduction of seven Algerian diplomats, including the Algerian Consul, in Gao on 5 April 2012. Taking advantage of the uprising of rebel movements in northern Mali in early 2012, MUJAO seized the towns of Gao and Bourem. On 5 December 2012, the sanctions Committee concerning Al-Qaida listed MUJAO for its association with AQIM, pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 12 of Security Council resolution 1989 (2011).

24. As part of the armed groups occupying northern Mali before the military offensive of the French Operation Serval, MUJAO reportedly recruited and used children and was responsible for rape and sexual violence. Following the intervention of French forces, MUJAO withdrew from the main urban areas in northern Mali to a more remote zone just south of Ansongo and Ménaka. In August

2013, a fraction of MUJAO merged with the Mokhtar Belmokhtar's al Muwaqi'un bil-Dima group to create the al Murabitun Brigade.

E. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

25. The AQIM organization was created in Algeria in 1998 by Hassan Hattab, as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat. The Group was a splinter entity of the Armed Islamic Group, the largest and most extremist group in Algeria at the time, and was renamed AQIM in January 2007, following the Group's union with Al-Qaida.

26. AQIM, led by Emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, aims at creating an Islamic State across the Maghreb in northern Africa and is organized into several zones controlled by multiple *katibas* (or battalions). The southern zone, also known as the Sahel zone, includes northern Mali.

27. AQIM provided financial and logistical support and backed Ansar Dine from the battle at Aguelhok on 24 January 2012 to the offensive in early January 2013 against southern Mali, including for the takeover of Tessalit on 10 March 2012, of Kidal and Gao on 30 March 2012, and of Timbuktu on 1 April 2012. In November 2012, AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJAO established joint offices in Gao.

28. Originally, AQIM was listed under the name of the Salafist Group for Call and Combat on 6 October 2001, pursuant to paragraph 8 (c) of Security Council resolution 1333 (2000), as being associated with Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden or the Taliban for participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf or in support of Al-Qaida.

F. Pro-government militias

29. In 2012, self-defence militias mobilized to oust Islamist groups in the Mopti-Sévaré area, close to the front line between the area controlled by the armed groups and the Government.

30. The Ganda Koy ("Masters of the land" in Songhai), the oldest of the above-mentioned militias, was created in 1994 during the 1991-1996 Tuareg rebellion in the North. Composed of mostly Songhai, but also of former soldiers of the Malian Army of Peuhl ethnicity, the militia was responsible for racially motivated attacks against Tuaregs and Arabs between 1994 and 1996. Ganda Izo ("Sons of the country" in Songhai) was created more recently, reportedly to protect the Peuhl, Songhai and Bella populations from Tuareg exactions. An additional militia, the Forces de libération du Nord (FLN), also based in Mopti, was created in March 2012. The United Nations received allegations that pro-government militias recruited and trained numerous children during 2012 and 2013.

31. The United Nations also received information that Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo and FLN had received material assistance from the Malian armed forces. Members of FLN allegedly received weapons for training purposes in Mopti; the Ganda Izo were reportedly supported by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, while Ganda Koy was led by a prominent Bamako lawyer connected to the security apparatus of the military junta.

G. Malian Defence and Security Forces

32. In the lead-up to the crisis, discontent and a general feeling of neglect were widespread among the Malian armed forces. Significant resources had been diverted from the counter-insurgency efforts in the North owing to the corruption of senior officers, which resulted in weakened logistics, low morale and desertions.

33. Both following the coup d'état, as well as in the context of their redeployment in the North, the Malian armed forces have reportedly committed serious abuses, including looting, extrajudicial killings, rape and other acts of sexual violence.

III. Grave violations against children

34. Since the beginning of the crisis, grave violations against children have been prominent in northern Mali and continued to be perpetrated by parties to the conflict throughout the reporting period. While particularly egregious in 2012, violations continued to a lesser extent in 2013. Important challenges regarding the monitoring and reporting of grave violations persist, such as the lack of access to many areas of the North, the limited staffing of the MINUSMA Child Protection Unit and the absence of child protection actors in the field. Despite the overall improvement in the political and security situation in 2013, children remain vulnerable and at risk of violations, particularly in the North.

35. In the period under review, parties to the conflict responsible for grave violations against children included AQIM, MUJAO, MNLA, Ansar Dine and, to a lesser extent, the Malian armed forces and pro-government militias. The most affected regions were Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. According to information verified by the United Nations, the most recurrent violations against children were sexual violence, killing and maiming, recruitment and use, and attacks on schools. Children were also detained for their alleged association with armed groups.

36. Overall, the nature and extent of violations has evolved throughout the reporting period. In the first months of 2012, MNLA were one of the main perpetrators of recruitment and use of children, as well as sexual violence and killing and maiming. Since April 2012, with the progressive marginalization of MNLA and the shift of the military balance in favour of Ansar Dine and MUJAO, with the backing of AQIM, in particular in Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao, violations have not only been linked to the military hostilities but also to the enforcement of Sharia law.

37. At the end of 2012, with the looming deployment of international forces in northern Mali, armed groups were increasingly preoccupied with defending their military gains, which included the laying of land mines and other explosive devices to repel attacks. In 2013, the number of grave violations recorded decreased, although concerns remained, in particular, with regard to the insecurity in the northern regions and cases of detention, as well as with regard to the identification, separation and reintegration of children because of limited access.

A. Recruitment and use of children

38. In annex I to my report of 15 May 2013 on children and armed conflict (S/2013/245), I listed Ansar Dine, MNLA and MUJAO for recruitment and use of children.

39. All armed groups operating in northern Mali are reported to have targeted children for the purpose of recruitment and use. At the end of 2012, the combined strength of armed groups operating in northern Mali was estimated to include approximately 3,000 core combatants (S/2012/894, para. 10).

40. While there was no clarity on the number of children that were, and may be currently, associated with armed groups in Mali, early information indicated that hundreds of children, mainly boys between 12 and 15 years of age, were recruited and used by those groups.

41. Children were pushed to join armed groups to overcome poverty or because of ethnic affiliations. Families, imams and community leaders reportedly played a role in the recruitment and use of children. Many children who had been sent by their parents to marabouts or to Islamic schools were recruited by armed groups (see S/2013/245). Schools were reported to be used as places for indoctrination and recruitment. With the progressive defeat of armed groups in northern Mali, most children are believed to have returned spontaneously to their families. Unknown numbers of children could, however, still be associated with the armed groups.

42. In early 2012, reports noted that children were recruited and used extensively by MNLA and that Tuareg families volunteered their children to MNLA to man checkpoints and conduct patrols, but also to participate in the hostilities. As MNLA was progressively losing control in the North to Ansar Dine and MUJAO, some children shifted their allegiance, especially those belonging to the Kidal-based group of Iyad Ag Ghali. Ansar Dine also reportedly recruited new children, luring them with the promise of gifts or payments. Both Ansar Dine and MUJAO are reported to have used children in various roles: children were seen armed with automatic weapons, manning checkpoints, enforcing the Islamic dress code for women, and conducting inspections of contraband items. Children recruited by Ansar Dine are reported to be mainly of Arab, Peuhl and Tuareg origins.

43. MUJAO allegedly began conducting recruitment drives in November 2011 among the children and youth of villages in the south of Gao, including in Wabaria, Kossey, Tchirissoro, Kadji, Fafa, Gouriefoumba and Gabero. In November 2012, the United Nations received reports of at least three camps in Gao where children were being trained. MUJAO allegedly paid 250,000 and 350,000 CFA francs, respectively, to orphans and those with families.

44. According to direct testimonies collected by the United Nations, MUJAO also extensively used children in Gao, Douentza and Bourem. Children associated with MUJAO were mostly armed with AK-47, carrying out patrols or manning security and/or toll checkpoints. Witnesses have seen children as young as 10 or 11 years of age associated with the Islamist group, including in a former gendarmerie camp in Taoussa, close to Bourem, and also standing guard at a base established in a former secondary school in Douentza. Children of Tuareg, Peuhl, Bella and Songhai ethnicity have been seen associated with MUJAO. It was reported that MUJAO forcefully recruited 15 children between 13 and 18 years of age in Ménaka, following the

clashes in Konna, leading families to send their children to the Niger to prevent recruitment.

45. Recruitment and association of children with MUJAO was also confirmed in interviews held with children handed over by French forces to child protection actors. For instance, on 9 March 2013, the French Army transferred five children captured among combatants to UNICEF. Two of them had been severely wounded, which suggests that they had taken an active part in the hostilities.

46. As with Ansar Dine, children were recruited with the promise of payment or gifts. Witnesses indicated that parents in Gao were reportedly paid 5,000 CFA francs per month to send their children to a madrasa (religious school), which had been established in the former house of the Mayor of Gao, where children were trained to use weapons and received Islamist instruction.

47. While the exact command and operational relationship between Ansar Dine and AQIM remains unclear, AQIM has reportedly been funding and supporting the use of children by Ansar Dine. It is also worth noting that both AQIM and MUJAO combatants maintained a low profile vis-à-vis the civilian population, often relying upon local cadres and children to manage the enforcement of Sharia law and involving them in face-to-face interactions with the civilian population.

48. In 2012, the United Nations also received reports of cross-border recruitment of children in refugee camps in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and the Niger by Islamist armed groups.

49. Self-defence militias, attempting to repeal the progressive takeover of the northern regions by the Islamist armed groups, in particular in the Mopti-Sévaré area which was under Government control, were also reported to have recruited and used children early in 2012. Both boys and girls were reported to be associated with Ganda Koy, Ganda Izo and FLN, which raised concerns over the risk of potential integration of those groups into the national security forces.

50. While the United Nations was not able to independently verify the presence of children among the ranks of the above-mentioned militias, it received credible reports of the continued presence of children in the ranks of FLN and Ganda Izo at the end of 2012.

51. Members of the Malian armed forces detained children captured in combat, in some cases subjecting them to ill-treatment. Some of the children arrested for alleged association with armed groups continue to be detained. Allegations of association of children with the armed forces have also been sporadically reported, and the Malian authorities have taken steps to work with the United Nations to undertake joint screening for age verification.

52. From March to December 2013, 24 children were reported to be held in detention facilities in Bamako for their alleged association with armed groups. Children were usually held in the same detention facilities as adults, but the United Nations was able to have access to them and identify them as minors. As of 31 December 2013, nine boys remained in detention in Bamako on conflict-related charges (three in detention at the Central Prison, another two boys in the high security section of the Central Prison, and four at Gendarmerie Camp 1). Three additional boys in the UNICEF-supported transit and care centres are at risk of being condemned for crimes related to their association with an armed group, as

they were charged before the signing of the Protocol between the Government of Mali and the United Nations on the Release and Handover of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups.

53. In July 2013, the United Nations identified 12 children detained in the prison of Kidal by MNLA. The children had been detained for several months. During the same visit, the United Nations observed the presence of children among MNLA soldiers ensuring security of the prison's perimeter. The United Nations advocated for their release and the children were reunited with their families.

B. Killing and maiming of children

54. There is very limited information available for 2012 and 2013 on the killing and maiming of children. Neither the Government nor humanitarian actors have systematically documented the number of people, including children, killed or injured during the conflict. It is alleged, however, that children associated with armed groups were used as human shields and as a result were reportedly killed and maimed in combat. Concern also remained over inter-ethnic reprisals against children of Arab or Tuareg origin, including by the national armed forces.

55. Explosive remnants of war have accounted for the majority of incidents recorded. Between March 2012 and December 2013, UNICEF confirmed 99 civilian casualties of explosive remnants of war, including the killing of six children and the injury of 51 others. For example, on 19 April 2012 in Timbuktu, two boys aged 9 and 13 were killed, and one boy aged 15 was maimed after an explosive remnant of war accident close to a military camp.

56. MNLA and Islamist armed groups did not specifically and systematically target children during the military offensive in northern Mali, nor subsequently during the Ansar Dine and MUJAO consolidation of authority in Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. Nevertheless, during the pillaging of an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a World Food Programme (WFP) warehouse in Gao in April 2012, a boy was shot dead by MNLA. In a separate incident in Niafunke, a girl was shot and injured by Ansar Dine elements when a protest broke out on a boat on its way from Mopti in September 2012. Anecdotal accounts of Islamist armed groups beating and whipping children accused of taking a bath naked in the river, or for smoking, were also received in Niafunke. In June 2012, MNLA killed three students aged 13 and 14 as they were protesting in Gao against the killing of a school director.

57. Sporadic incidents of the maiming of children by unknown armed elements were also reported. For example, on 23 October 2013, a six-year-old boy was killed and an 11-year-old was wounded during a suicide attack on a MINUSMA checkpoint in Tessalit. On 27 October, a 16-year-old boy was shot in the leg when unidentified individuals attacked a MNLA checkpoint in the village of Talahandak near Kidal. The boy suffered a double fracture. On 7 November, a group of three civilians including two children, herding their goats near Gouati, 17 kilometres from Niafunke, were attacked by unknown armed men. It is reported that in the same incident a 14-year-old boy was shot dead by armed men.

C. Rape and sexual violence

58. Throughout 2012, sexual violence against women and girls by the armed groups was reported to be widespread and systematic in northern Mali. Numerous allegations of rape of girls — often by multiple men — were received by the United Nations. Sexual violence has been perpetrated either in the context of abductions for the purpose of sexual slavery and/or forced marriage. Often the victims were later returned to their families with the payment of a "compensation" to their parents. In 2012, 211 cases of sexual and gender-based violence (including rape, sexual slavery, forced marriage, sexual violence in places of detention and gang rape) by armed actors, including by MNLA, MUJAO, Ansar Dine and AQIM, have been reported. Sexual violence has been used by those groups as a tactic of war to humiliate, instil fear and exert control over communities. On that basis in 2013, I listed Ansar Dine, MNLA and MUJAO for sexual violence in the annexes to my annual report of 15 May 2013 on children and armed conflict (S/2013/245) and my report of 14 March 2013 on sexual violence in conflict (S/2013/149).

59. In one case, two Songhai sisters, aged 14 and 16, were allegedly forcibly taken from their home in Gao by elements of MNLA and raped by several men throughout the night. Also in Gao, in June 2012, four MUJAO elements abducted and raped a Bella girl and threatened her father when he attempted to save his daughters.

60. Information consolidated by the Gender-Based Violence Sub-Cluster of the Protection Cluster in Mali indicates that 106 cases of sexual violence against children, out of a total of 620 cases of sexual violence, were registered in the period from April 2012 to December 2013, in areas affected by the conflict and/or with displaced populations. A significant number of those victims were from the regions of Gao and Timbuktu. In 2013, protection actors reached 276 survivors of rape with essential life-saving services. More than one third of the 276 cases of rape reported were perpetrated by more than one person. Of those, 68 of the incidents (25 per cent) were committed against children aged 2 to 17.

61. Mali's Penal Code (2001) defines rape and other forms of sexual violence against children as crimes or, if committed during conflict, as war crimes. While the Government of Mali has explicitly mandated judicial authorities to prioritize cases of sexual violence, lack of sufficient resources, obstacles in accessing justice, and social attitudes resulted in only seven survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, including four children, having pursued legal recourse. Of those, one trial for rape of a girl by a Malian armed forces soldier was ongoing at the military court at the time of writing. Girls and women face significant obstacles to accessing justice and only a few pursue legal recourse. Fear of reprisals or rejection leads many survivors and their families to accept alternative recourses, such as reparations in the form of cash, livestock or other material goods.

62. The risk of sexual violence against children remains high, given the presence of armed forces and non-State actors, continued insecurity in the North, weakened community structures, protection and care systems, as well as displacement.

63. Insecurity, but also the unreliable communication systems and weak transportation infrastructure, continue to impede humanitarian access and limit survivors' ability to access services. With partners involved in prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence only partially deployed in conflict-affected areas, support to survivors of sexual violence remains limited. That is also

because of the lack of community-based and government-funded care programmes. In addition, only a limited number of humanitarian actors have the technical expertise and the resources to provide a full range of services to survivors of rape and other acts of sexual violence.

64. At the time of writing, there were 21 centres for psychosocial, legal and medical-oriented support, seven of which were government-run and included temporary transit care support to allow for the provision of multisectoral assistance of cases of sexual violence. Sexual violence support kits were made available in the regions of Kayes, Ségou, Bamako, Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu, Sikasso, Koulikoro and Kidal.

D. Attacks on schools and hospitals

65. Access to education in Mali was severely impacted by the crisis. During 2012, the majority of children remaining in northern Mali suffered violations of their right to education owing to physical damage to school installation and equipment, the flight of teachers from the North, and the influence of the Islamist armed groups on the conduct of education.

66. There were an estimated 252,690 students in schools in the conflict-affected regions prior to the crisis. At the peak of the conflict, following the French-led military intervention in January 2013, access to education was severely affected, with the forced closure of 1,418 schools in Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, Ségou and Mopti. Some 75 to 80 per cent of school-age children who were receiving an education before the crisis in the three northern regions of the country were estimated not to have attended classes in 2012 and the first half of 2013. Mali's Education Cluster in 2012 estimated that 85 per cent of teachers had fled the North to neighbouring countries or to their home regions in the South.

67. A total of 200 schools were reported looted, damaged, bombed, used for military purposes or contaminated with unexploded ordnances. In April and May 2012, at least 115 schools in the regions of Kidal, Timbuktu, Gao and Mopti were attacked, pillaged or sacked by the armed groups. French air strikes reportedly damaged several school buildings, including the Teaching Academy in Douentza, which were being used by Islamist armed groups as their military base.

68. While incidents of military use of schools were reported up until January 2013, the majority of schools were vacated following the French military intervention. It was reported, however, that as of November 2013 MNLA was still using the Lycée Attaher Af Ily in Kidal. Thirty elements of MNLA established a military post inside the school and currently use two buildings and the hangar of the school. Twenty schools were used for military purposes by Ansar Dine and MUJAO in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal; they were freed after the intervention of community leaders in May-June 2012. In the south of the country, 14 schools were verified to be used for military purposes by elements of a self-defence group in the Mopti area during the same period. The schools were vacated following advocacy by the United Nations and partners.

69. Armed groups reportedly interfered in the conduct of classes, demanding that their interpretation of Sharia law be taught in schools in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu and northern Mopti. MUJAO and Ansar Dine have prohibited the teaching

of subjects perceived to be "Western", including the English language and philosophy, as well as sexual education. The armed groups have also forced boys and girls to be separated and demanded that girls wear veils. That interference, and the fact that schools have been used as a place for recruitment and indoctrination, strongly impacted the access of children, in particular girls, to education.

70. As of December 2013, the regions most heavily affected by the conflict (Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu) had seen a return of 147,425 students, and 769 out of 1,161 schools reopened (68 per cent). Insecurity continues, however, to force school closure in a significant number of areas. As of that month, only 5 per cent had reopened in the Kidal region, while only 37 per cent of schools were functional in Ménaka, Gao region. As of 31 December 2013, 24 per cent of schools remained closed.

71. According to official government data, out of the 1,581 health structures in Mali, 29 were completely destroyed and 226 health structures were partially destroyed in the conflict. As of 15 November 2013, 88 of those health structures were not yet functioning and 185 were only partially functioning. Most of the damage happened during the armed conflict of early 2012, with initial reports indicating that close to half of the health facilities in the three northern regions were unable to function as a result of physical damage, looting of equipment or the displacement of health workers.

72. A Health Resources Availability Mapping System survey carried out in March-April 2013 by the Ministry of Health and the World Health Organization concluded that vaccination services and services dedicated to the management of cases with severe acute malnutrition had been significantly affected by the humanitarian crisis in Mali. That was especially observed in the northern part of the country, in relation to the destruction of the health infrastructure and the migration of the health personnel because of the insecurity.

73. The above-mentioned precarious state of services had serious consequences for the health of the most vulnerable children and women, such as the outbreak of measles, malaria and cholera over the past two years. The shortage of skilled manpower and a major deficit in medical equipment, logistics and infrastructure continue to affect the functioning of the health-care facilities.

E. Denial of humanitarian access

74. Until the first half of 2013, children's access to humanitarian assistance in the North was severely restricted by the conduct of hostilities and military operations and the absence of service providers. Approximately 873,000 children out of a total population of 1.5 million people in the North were affected by the lack of access by humanitarian assistance actors. In the aftermath of Operation Serval and until mid-February 2013, while most of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) present in the North continued their activities, movements outside the main cities were suspended. Between March 2012 and February 2013, the northern airports (Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal) were not accessible to civilian flights. In the meantime, NGOs not already present in the North were unable to reach Timbuktu or Gao because of ongoing hostilities and restrictions on movements. An armed forces checkpoint in Konna prevented any northbound movements and restricted access on

the roads from Mopti to Timbuktu and from Mopti to Gao (from Konna) until mid-February 2013.

75. Resumption of humanitarian flights for Timbuktu in February 2013, Gao in April 2013 and Kidal in June 2013 has contributed to broader humanitarian access to northern areas. Owing to the extreme volatility of the security situation prevailing in the Kidal area, regular access to this region remains, however, challenging.

76. During the reporting period, the United Nations verified one case of attack against humanitarian actors in which a humanitarian vehicle was hijacked in Ménaka in August 2013. While the overall number of direct attacks against humanitarian actors has been limited, serious concerns remain over risks of attacks in the northern regions, in particular in the light of the recent targeting by armed groups of the Malian armed forces, French forces and MINUSMA.

IV. Advocacy and dialogue with parties to the conflict

77. The United Nations continues to work with the Government and national and international partners for the protection and release of children formerly associated with the armed groups. My Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Leila Zerrougui, and my Special Representative for Mali, Albert Koenders, as well as UNICEF, have continued to advocate for the protection of vulnerable children, including for the release and reintegration of children associated with armed groups.

78. In July 2013, the United Nations advocated with MNLA to release the children who were kept in detention by MNLA in Kidal. As a result, three children were transferred to Bamako, where they received interim care in transit centres. Three children of Arab origin were handed over directly by MNLA to Arab community leaders. In September, MNLA decided to release all its detainees (approximately 30 detainees), including five remaining children. Upon their release, these children were reunited with their families in Gao.

79. With the exception of these ad hoc interactions, a structured dialogue with MNLA has not yet started. In August 2013, a preliminary discussion was held in Kidal with MNLA leaders and child protection actors with a view to sensitizing them to end and prevent grave violations against children.

80. With respect to measures adopted by the Government following advocacy by the United Nations, on 7 February 2013 an interministerial circular was signed by the Ministers of Justice, Family and the Promotion of Women and Children, the Defence and Territorial Administration, and the Minister of Internal Security and Civil Protection, on the prevention, protection and reintegration into the family of children released from armed forces and groups. It noted that military, political, administrative authorities and community leaders were committed to the protection of those children.

81. In addition, on 1 July 2013, the Government and the United Nations signed a Protocol on the Release and Handover of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups, which highlights the responsibility of the Government to handover children associated with armed forces and groups to either their agency in charge of child protection or to UNICEF within 48 hours.

82. Following the signing of the above-mentioned Protocol, 14 boys were transferred to two UNICEF-supported transit and care centres in Bamako. Five of those children were reunited with their families on 8 November 2013 but are still awaiting the letters detailing that charges against them have been dropped. Two males who stated that they were children, but were classified as adults by the authorities, were released in December 2013.

83. In response to allegations of recruitment and use of children by the Malian armed forces, MINUSMA has requested and obtained authorization from the Government to conduct, in collaboration with UNICEF and the Malian authorities, a screening and administrative age verification of the Malian armed forces. At the structural level, however, lack of access to civil documentation and registration, which have been aggravated by the crisis, creates additional protection risks and hinders access to assistance and services for children, in particular in the North. Similarly, the absence of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration strategy complicates the identification of children who may currently be associated with the armed groups.

84. In October 2012, the Government established an interministerial working group on grave violations against children. The objectives of this entity include preventing recruitment and use of children through public information campaigns and ascertaining the presence of children in self-defence militias through joint verification missions with international partners. The working group was functional during the last quarter of 2012 but did not meet in 2013.

V. Prevention and response to assist children affected by the conflict

85. With the establishment of MINUSMA, which integrated AFISMA military contingents including 2,000 soldiers of the National Army of Chad, concerns were raised because of the listing of the Chadian Army in annex I to my report on children and armed conflict (S/2013/245) for recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. Chad, which had been listed since 2009, signed an action plan with the United Nations in 2011. Until 2013, that plan had only been partially implemented owing to limited capacity and resources.

86. The opportunity of integrating Chad as a troop contributor into MINUSMA, in application of the United Nations human rights screening policy, generated strong political momentum to accelerate the implementation of the Action Plan. To that end, my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and UNICEF undertook a joint mission to Chad from 12 to 15 May 2013 and developed a 10-point road map for the implementation of the Action Plan jointly with the Chadian authorities. Subsequently, in June 2013, the Military Adviser of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat also travelled to Chad to further assist the Chadian military authorities in developing the modalities of implementation.

87. At the same time, child protection actors conducted a screening and sensitization of the Chadian contingent deployed in Tessalit ahead of the transfer of authority from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July 2013. At the time of writing, the implementation of the 10-point road map was well advanced, with all measures being implemented but requiring sustained efforts in the long term.

88. With respect to the programmatic response to assist vulnerable children in Mali, UNICEF prioritizes assistance to prevent recruitment and protect children from violence. NGO partners have reported to UNICEF that many children who had spontaneously returned to their families after having been associated with armed groups did not want to receive any attention or be singled out for having been associated with armed groups.

89. Throughout 2013, UNICEF continued to advocate and provide services via its implementing partners and supported the operationalization of two transit and care centres for children released from armed groups. As of 31 December, 28 children, all boys, have transited via the two centres. To date, 15 boys have been reunited with their families and 12 boys remain in the centres.

90. UNICEF is working in close collaboration with the Ministry of Family and the Promotion of Women and Children to reinforce community-based mechanisms focused on prevention and response to benefit vulnerable children, including those who have spontaneously demobilized and those at risk of recruitment/re-recruitment and violence. Throughout 2013, they have continued to advocate and provide services to support the most vulnerable children, including children who had been associated with armed groups.

91. With respect to access to education for children affected by the conflict, the Education Cluster has supported the national authorities, in particular in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu and Mopti, including by facilitating the return to school of approximately 147,000 children. That represents over two thirds of the 200,000 children who had been affected by the conflict. The Education Cluster also enabled the distribution of 122,000 school kits, the training of 5,092 teachers on psychosocial support and 750 teachers in peace education, and the provision of 20 tents. WFP school feeding programmes contributed to support school attendance of more than 111,000 children in 576 schools in Gao and Timbuktu during the 2013-2014 academic year.

92. UNICEF and other partners have undertaken an accelerated mine risk education programme to prevent accidents and mitigate the impact of explosive remnants of war on children. Activities were focused on areas identified as polluted or where clearance operations had been conducted by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) teams and partners; 141,044 people have been directly reached by mine risk education activities, while 525 personnel from government, civil society and implementing partners have been trained to conduct risk education activities.

VI. Observations and recommendations

93. I urge all parties in Mali to immediately halt grave violations against children, and I call on armed groups to release all children in their ranks, to abide by international humanitarian and human rights law, and to comply with Security Council resolutions on children and armed conflict.

94. I also urge all parties in Mali to ensure safe access of humanitarian actors to populations affected by the conflict, and to provide necessary humanitarian assistance and basic social services.

95. I commend the commitment and efforts made by the Government of Mali for the protection of children. In particular, I welcome the adoption by the Government of an interministerial circular on the prevention, protection and reintegration into the family of children released from armed forces and armed groups, as well as the signing of the Protocol on the Release and Handover of Children Associated with Armed Forces and Groups. I encourage the Government of Mali to sustain its commitments and to continue to work with the United Nations in this regard towards ensuring the protection of children affected by the armed conflict.

96. I encourage the Malian authorities and international partners to ensure that all disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and security sector reform strategies take into account the specific needs of children affected by the armed conflict and the protection of their rights.

97. I am concerned by the continued detention of children and I encourage the Government of Mali to work with the United Nations to establish a joint mechanism for the review of cases of minors detained on charges related to the armed conflict and association with armed groups.

98. I encourage the Malian Defence and Security Forces, with the support of the Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting and relevant international partners, to establish recruitment procedures and age verification measures to ensure that children are not recruited into their forces.

99. The United Nations and humanitarian partners remain concerned with the continued incidence of sexual violence. Ensuring timely and appropriate care for child survivors by improving geographic coverage and quality of care in the most vulnerable areas should remain a priority for international partners. I also encourage the Government to redouble its efforts to prevent and respond to sexual violence, including by holding accountable perpetrators of such crimes. The United Nations, in collaboration with its partners, is committed to enhancing efforts in support of the Government, including facilitating provision of services for survivors.

Annex

MALI
National capital
Regional capital
Town, village
Major airport
International boundary
Regional boundary
Main road
Other road
Track
Railroad
ALGERIA
MAURITANIA
TOMBOUCTOU
GAO
KIDAL
MOPTI
SEGOU
KAYES
KOULIKORO
SENEGAL
GUINEA
BURKINA FASO
NIGER
BENIN
NIGERIA
GHANA
COTE D'IVOIRE
Tombouctou
Gao
Kidal
Mopti
Ségou
Kayes
Koulikoro
Sikasso
Bamako
Gourma-Rharous
Bourem
Ansongo
Ménaka
Douentza
Bandiagara
Niono
Nara
Nioro du Sahel
Aguelhok
Tessalit
Taoudenni
Goundam
Diré
Niafunke
Koutiala
Bougouni
Yanfolila
Kolondieba
Kita
Kéniéba
Diéma
Nioro
Mourdiah
Banamba
Dioila
Bafoulabé
Aourou
Ayoûn el 'Atroûs
Nema
Rás el Mâ
Timbuktu
Douentza
Ouahigouya
Dédougou
Ouagadougou
Fada N'gourma
Tenkodogo
Diapaga
Kandi
Nikki
Parakou
Malanville
Gaya
Dosso
Tillabéri
Niamey
Tahoua
Agadez
Arlit
Birnin Konni
Maradi
Zinder
Diffa
Gumni
Kontagora
Kano
Sokoto
Kebbi
Wawa
Kolo
Kamba
Tchirozerine
In Guezzam
Assamakka
Poste Maurice Cortier
Bordj Mokhtar
Tidjikdja
Kiffa
Bogué
Aleg
Boutilimit
Rosso
Podor
Matam
Kaédi
Selibaby
Kayes
Bafoulabé
Kita
Dioila
Bamako
Koulikoro
Ségou
Mopti
Sikasso
Koutiala
Bougouni
Yanfolila
Kolondieba
Niono
Nara
Nioro du Sahel
Aourou
Douentza
Bandiagara
Diré
Goundam
Rás el Mâ
Timbuktu
Gourma-Rharous
Bourem
Gao
Ansongo
Ménaka
Andéramboukane
Aguelhok
Tessalit
Kidal
Taoudenni
Tinzaouatène
Abalessa
Tahoua
Agadez
Arlit
Niamey
Dosso
Tillabéri
Birnin Konni
Maradi
Zinder
Diffa
Gumni
Kontagora
Kano
Sokoto
Kebbi
Wawa
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Kamba
Malanville
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Nikki
Kandi
Fada N'gourma
Diapaga
Tenkodogo
Ouagadougou
Dédougou
Koudougou
Kaya
Yako
Ouahigouya
Gaya
Dosso
Tillabéri
Niamey
Tera
Dori
Djibo
Tougan
Nouna
Banfora
Gaoua
Léo
Diébougou
Navrongo
Bawku
Dapaoong
Kankan
Siguiri
Kérouané
Faranah
Dinguiraye
Labé
Gaoual
Koundara
Boké
Kindia
Mamou
Dalaba
Pita
Télimélé
Fria
Conakry
Forécariah
Kissidougou
Guéckédou
Macenta
Nzérékoré
Lola
Beyla
Kérémé
Bissau
Bafatá
Gabú
Boké
Labé
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Kindia
Conakry
Forécariah
Kissidougou
Guéckédou
Macenta
Nzérékoré
Lola
Beyla
Kérémé
Kankan
Siguiri
Kérouané
Faranah
Dinguiraye
Gaoual
Koundara
Bissau
Bafatá
Gabú
Freetown
Bo
Kenema
Kailahun
Monrovia
Ganta
Sanniquellie
Zwedru
Harper
Buchanan
Greenville
Sinoe
Tabou
Sassandra
San-Pédro
Soubré
Daloa
Man
Odienné
Séguéla
Bouaké
Yamoussoukro
Abidjan
Grand-Bassam
Agboville
Dabou
Grand-Lahou
Abengourou
Agnibilékrou
Bondoukou
Tanda
Dimbokro
Daoukro
Bouna
Boundiali
Korhogo
Ferkessédougou
Katiola
Bouaké
Yamoussoukro
Abidjan
Grand-Bassam
Agboville
Dabou
Grand-Lahou
Abengourou
Agnibilékrou
Bondoukou
Tanda
Dimbokro
Daoukro
Bouna
Boundiali
Korhogo
Ferkessédougou
Katiola
Sassandra
San-Pédro
Soubré
Daloa
Man
Odienné
Séguéla
Tabou
Sinoe
Greenville
Buchanan
Harper
Zwedru
Ganta
Sanniquellie
Monrovia
Kailahun
Kenema
Bo
Freetown
Tombouctou (Timbuktu)
Gourma-Rharous
Bourem
Gao
Ansongo
Ménaka
Andéramboukane
Aguelhok
Tessalit
Kidal
Taoudenni
Goundam
Rás el Mâ
Douentza
Bandiagara
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Mopti
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Koulikoro
Sikasso
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Matam
Kaédi
Selibaby
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
Map No. 4231 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS
March 2013
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2014/268

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 April 2014

Original: English

Note by the President of the Security Council

Further to the measures contained in the note by the President of the Security Council of 26 July 2010 (S/2010/507) and in a further effort to enhance the efficiency and transparency of the Council's work, as well as the wider participation of Council members in the drafting of Council products and their wider responsibility for drafting, the members of the Security Council have agreed on the following:

(a) Without prejudice to the rights accorded by the Charter of the United Nations and the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the members of the Security Council support, where appropriate, the informal arrangement whereby one or more Council members (as "penholder(s)") initiate and chair the informal drafting process. This informal arrangement, where appropriate, aims to facilitate timely initiatives to ensure Council action while preserving an element of continuity, with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the Council's work;

(b) Any member of the Security Council may be a penholder. Members of the Council are encouraged to act as the penholder(s) in the drafting of documents, including resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council;

(c) The members of the Security Council affirm their commitment to enhancing the participation of all members of the Security Council in the drafting of documents, including resolutions, presidential statements and press statements of the Council. To that end, the members of the Security Council encourage penholders, as early as possible in the drafting exercise, to ensure the exchange of information among all Security Council members and to engage in timely consultations with all Council members;

(d) In addition, the members of the Security Council intend to continue to informally consult with the broader United Nations membership, in particular interested Member States, including countries directly involved or specifically affected, neighbouring States and countries with particular contributions to make, as well as with regional organizations and Groups of Friends, when drafting, inter alia, resolutions, presidential statements and press statements, as appropriate.

14-29967 (E) 150414

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United Nations A/68/845–S/2014/269

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
23 April 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda items 33 and 110

Prevention of armed conflict

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 11 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to the following information.

In March 2011, the regime in Syria resorted to repression against the fraternal Syrian people, which had come out in a peaceful revolution to assert its legitimate rights. Since then, it has twisted and distorted the facts in order to deflect attention from that repressive response. The regime has denied its flagrant violations of international law and international human rights law. In numerous letters to United Nations entities, it has levelled a charge of terrorism against those States, including Qatar, that support the rights of the Syrian people. The letters are filled with lies and unsubstantiated claims. The most recent example, dated 10 April 2014 (A/68/836-S/2014/260), targets Qatar. The State of Qatar will not be drawn into such underhanded attempts to deflect attention from the tragedy that the regime has inflicted on the Syrian people. It does, however, wish to recall the following points.

When the popular revolution in Syria began, the State of Qatar spared no effort in calling for the legitimate demands of the fraternal Syrian people to be heard. It argued that the regime's response to those demands was a dangerous one. However, the regime left its entreaties unanswered, preferring instead to ramp up its repression.

Qatari diplomacy believes in the importance of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The State of Qatar therefore pursued its efforts to find a political solution to the crisis through the League of Arab States, as the competent regional organization. In so doing, it complied with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, which upholds the role of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes. Qatar chaired the Arab ministerial committee on the situation in Syria, which visited Damascus on 26 October 2011. It conveyed to the Syrian regime the

appeal of the Arab States for an end to the security escalation and for the voice of the people to be heard. However, the regime in Syria continued to hold the lives of its own people in contempt. It ignored the efforts of the Arab States, all the while denying that it was doing so.

Nevertheless, the State of Qatar did not despair of a peaceful solution to the crisis. Through the League of Arab States, it worked towards and led the visit of a ministerial delegation to the United Nations on 31 January 2012, in accordance with Article 52, paragraph 2 of the Charter. The delegation briefed the Security Council, warning that the Syrian crisis would have dangerous repercussions if the international community could not swiftly find a solution. Unfortunately, the Syrian regime persisted in its repression. The result was the current predicament of Syria, in which tens of thousands have died, millions of civilians have been displaced or driven out of the country, and chemical weapons and internationally prohibited weapons have been used to horrific effect against innocent civilians. The regime did not leave matters there; it also decided to twist and distort the facts. Among other things, it has focused on Qatar's actions to help the fraternal Syrian people and press for a political solution to the crisis.

With such a political solution in mind, the State of Qatar welcomed Security Council resolution 2139 (2014), which sought to alleviate the suffering of the fraternal Syrian people. The resolution stresses that the political solution represents the only sustainable opportunity to resolve the situation in Syria peacefully. The State of Qatar participated in the first meeting of the Action Group for Syria, which took place on 30 June 2012 in Geneva. The final communiqué of that meeting was endorsed by the Security Council as a basis for the political solution to the crisis. Qatar also took part in the high-level Geneva Conference on Syria ("Geneva II") and made intensive efforts to convince the Syrian opposition to participate. Yet the Syrian regime has shown at every opportunity that it has no desire for a political solution to the crisis and is not genuinely committed to negotiations. Instead, it has adopted delaying tactics, as United Nations officials stated in a briefing before the General Assembly on 14 March 2014.

In its past and current actions regarding the crisis in Syria, the State of Qatar has been motivated by its commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international conventions, including the right of peoples to self-determination and a life of dignity. It has sought to protect and promote human rights, while safeguarding the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria. It follows that Qatar completely rejects crimes against humanity, war crimes and other grave violations of international law and international human rights law. Qatar also rejects and condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, irrespective of its source. It has been at the forefront of States supporting important international initiatives, such as dialogue among civilizations and cultures and dialogue among religions and peoples. It spares no effort in promoting those concepts, which encourage peaceful coexistence and the rejection of terrorism, violence and extremism.

The State of Qatar therefore affirms that all of its actions to help the Syrian people stem from the Charter of the United Nations; the relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the United Nations; and international law and norms. Qatar will continue to cooperate with the

international community to support and assist the Syrian people and bring an end to its suffering.

The State of Qatar calls on the entities of the United Nations, including the Security Council, to take every necessary measure to ensure that the civilian population of Syria is protected from the crimes of the Syrian regime, and to take steps to hold officials accountable for the war crimes and crimes against humanity that have been committed in Syria. The perpetrators must not be allowed to go unpunished.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 110, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alya Ahmed Saif **Al-Thani**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2014/270

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2014

Original: English

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,

Further reaffirming the significance of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide as an effective international instrument for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, emphasizing that the crime of genocide as recognized in this Convention, is an odious scourge that has inflicted great losses on humanity, and that further international cooperation is required to facilitate the timely prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide,

Recognizing that states bear the primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as other individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law,

Acknowledging the important role played by regional and subregional arrangements in the prevention of, and response to, situations that may lead to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, especially noting Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union,

Recalling the important role of the Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, whose functions include acting as an early warning mechanism to prevent potential situations that could result in genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing,

Recalling the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established pursuant to its resolution 955 (1994) for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of

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international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, and *further recalling* that genocide involves intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,

Recalling the conclusions of the final report (S/1994/1405) of the Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 935 (1994), among which included that "there exists overwhelming evidence to prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi group were perpetrated," and noting that during the genocide, Hutu and others who opposed it were also killed,

Recalling that the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR issued, on 16 June 2006, a judicial notice (ICTR-98-44-AR73(C)) concluding that it was a "fact of common knowledge" that "between 6 April and 17 July 1994, there was a genocide in Rwanda against the Tutsi ethnic group", *further recalling* that more than a million people were killed during the genocide, including Hutu and others who opposed it, and *noting with concern* any form of denial of that genocide,

Noting with concern that many genocide suspects continue to elude justice, including the remaining nine ICTR-indicted fugitives,

Reaffirming its strong opposition to impunity for serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, and emphasizing in this context the responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations to end impunity and, to that end, to thoroughly investigate and prosecute persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or other serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in order to avoid their recurrence and to seek sustainable peace, justice, truth and reconciliation,

Stressing that the fight against impunity and to ensure accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes has been strengthened through the work on and prosecution of these crimes in the international criminal justice system, ad hoc and mixed tribunals as well as specialized chambers in national tribunals; and recognizing in this regard the contribution of the International Criminal Court, in accordance with the principle of complementarity to national criminal jurisdictions as set out in the Rome Statute, towards holding accountable those responsible for such crimes, and reiterating its call on the importance of State cooperation with these courts and tribunals in accordance with the States' respective obligations,

Recognizing the contribution made by the ICTR to the fight against impunity and the development of international criminal justice, especially in relation to the crime of genocide,

Noting that the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious international crimes, through the national justice system, including the Gacaca Courts of Rwanda, and the ICTR, contributed to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace in Rwanda,

Recalling that leaders and members of the *Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda* (FDLR), were among the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others who opposed the

genocide were also killed, *further recalling* that the FDLR is a group under United Nations sanctions, operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and which has continued to promote and commit ethnically based and other killings in Rwanda and in the DRC, and *stressing* the importance of neutralizing this group, in line with the Security Council resolution 2098 (2013),

Recalling that the General Assembly has, on 23 December 2003, designated the date of 7th April as "*the International Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*",

Emphasizing the particular importance of all forms of education in order to prevent the commission of future genocides,

1. *Calls upon* States to recommit to prevent and fight against genocide, and other serious crimes under international law, *reaffirms* paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (A/60/L.1) on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and *underscores* the importance of taking into account lessons learned from the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, during which Hutu and others who opposed the genocide were also killed;

2. *Condemns without reservation* any denial of this Genocide, and *urges* Member States to develop educational programmes that will inculcate future generations with the lessons of the Genocide in order to help prevent future genocides;

3. *Welcomes* efforts by member states to investigate and prosecute those accused of this genocide, *calls upon* all States to cooperate with the ICTR, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and the Government of Rwanda in the arrest and prosecution of the remaining nine ICTR-indicted fugitives, and *further calls upon* States to investigate, arrest, prosecute or extradite, in accordance with applicable international obligations, all other fugitives accused of genocide residing on their territories, including those who are FDLR leaders;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure greater collaboration between existing early warning mechanisms for genocide prevention and other serious international crimes, in order to help to detect, assess and respond to sources of tension and points of risks or identify vulnerable populations;

5. *Calls upon* States that have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide to consider doing so as a matter of high priority and, where necessary, to enact national legislation in order to meet their obligations under that Convention.

United Nations A/68/846–S/2014/271

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 99 (q)
General and complete disarmament: measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 14 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

Since the outset of the Syrian crisis, the countries that have been conspiring against Syria, led by the United States of America, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have sought to create pretexts to justify their ongoing aggression against Syria. This effort is part of the unjust campaign that those countries launched on 21 August 2013 when they accused the Syrian Government of using chemical weapons against its own people in the massacre that occurred in eastern Ghutah, and in which dozens of Syrians were killed.

A little less than one year after this criminal act of terrorism occurred, the facts are gradually coming to light. Several documented studies, reports and research papers confirm the direct and indirect involvement of the American administration, along with Turkey and other States, in the commission of this odious crime and other crimes that have occurred in Syria, including the Khan Asal massacre of 19 March 2013. This information is in line with the lengthy article by the American journalist Seymour Hersh, who is known for his investigative work, that was recently published in the *London Review of Books*. In that article, Hersh reveals that the Turkish Government is behind the eastern Ghutah massacre and other crimes, such as the one that was committed in Khan Asal, and that the American administration was aware of this crime and its perpetrators and tampered with evidence that proves that the crime was committed by the Nusrah Front, a branch of Al-Qaida, in order to justify an American attack on Syria. Hersh affirms that he has documents confirming the veracity of the information he published. In an article published in the Friday, 11 April 2014, edition of the British newspaper *The Independent*, the well-known British journalist Robert Fisk confirmed Hersh's conclusion that Turkey was involved in and the American administration was aware

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of the use by the Nusrah Front of toxic substances in eastern Ghutah. An article by the British journalist Patrick Cockburn that appeared in the 13 April 2014 edition of the British newspaper *The Independent on Sunday* and information recently published on the American website Veterans Today confirm Hersh's and Fisk's conclusions, in particular those regarding Turkish and American support for the terrorist Nusrah Front and efforts to cover up its crimes in eastern Ghutah and other parts of Syria, including the use of sarin gas and other toxic substances. Several other articles and studies also confirm that Turkey and America are in fact complicit in those terrorist crimes that were committed in Syria.

Covering up these terrorist crimes and shielding the perpetrators, accusing the Syrian Government and attempting to fabricate pretexts will only encourage armed terrorist groups to use yet again such internationally prohibited weapons and commit further heinous crimes against the Syrian people, as well as the peoples of the region and of the world. The Security Council and the Secretary-General have been provided with substantive information that reveals the intention of armed terrorist groups to use toxic substances in Rif Dimashq, the Hama countryside and other parts of Syria, in order to accuse the Syrian Government of having committed such abhorrent crimes. A few days ago, the Syrian Government sent the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) a new document containing irrefutable evidence that armed terrorist groups are in possession of toxic chlorine gas and that they intend to use it in Aleppo governorate and other parts of Syria.

The Syrian Government has also transmitted to the Secretary-General and the Security Council other documents containing irrefutable evidence that terrorist groups possess toxic gases and that these groups are conducting tests in Turkey and threatening to use those gases against the Syrian people. This evidence includes information on a group of persons led by the Syrian national Haytham al-Qassab, who, along with 11 Turkish nationals, were in possession of 2 kilograms of prohibited sarin gas when the Turkish police arrested them in Adana. On 16 September 2013, in a 130-page indictment, the Adana Public Prosecutor confirmed that the persons arrested belong to the Nusrah Front. By the time the trial started at the end of October 2013, all of those persons had been released, with exception of al-Qassab, who was released immediately after the first hearing owing to pressure applied by the Turkish Government.

In its resolution 2118 (2013), the Security Council reiterates the provisions of resolution 1540 (2004) by requiring Members States to inform the Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004). Paragraph 14 of resolution 2118 (2013) reads as follows: "*Decides* that Member States shall inform immediately the Security Council of any violation of resolution 1540 (2004), including acquisition by non-State actors of chemical weapons, their means of delivery and related materials in order to take necessary measures therefore". This means, above all, that terrorists and extremists must not possess such weapons.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic holds the American administration, the Turkish Government and Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and terrorist organizations fully responsible for the crimes that were committed in Syria with chemical weapons, including the recent attack in Kafr Zayta, or any crimes that might be thus committed against the Syrian people.

By putting this information before the Security Council and the international community, Syria is calling on them to shoulder their responsibilities in accordance with the Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, in particular all provisions of resolution 1373 (2001), as well as resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1540 (2004), and in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 3314 (XXIX) of 1974 and 2625 (XXV) of 1970. They must also hold accountable those countries that are implicated in these crimes, which were committed with toxic substances, in particular the United States of America, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, France and Israel. They must further call on them to end their support for terrorist groups and the violations that threaten security and peace in Syria and the region those groups are committing. In that connection, Syria reiterates the importance of ridding the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction and reaffirms its adherence to its legal commitments pursuant to the agreements and protocols that it has ratified, including the Chemical Weapons Convention.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 99 (q), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Permanent Representative
of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations

United Nations A/68/842–S/2014/272

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
15 April 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 42
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 14 April 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to a recent escalation of illegal and dangerous activities of the Turkish air force within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR).

In particular, the Turkish air force has significantly escalated its interference with civilian and military aircraft flying through Cyprus's national airspace and the Nicosia FIR. Military radar operators in Turkey and in the occupied area of Cyprus notify aircraft that they are about to enter the purported "TRNC airspace" and warn them either to communicate with "Ercan air control" and alter their route or risk being intercepted by the Turkish air force.

A recent example of these occurrences is an incident that took place on 1 April 2014, when an Israeli civilian aircraft, which had obtained a diplomatic flight permit from the competent authorities of the Republic of Cyprus and was conducting an aerial photo shoot commissioned by the Department of Lands and Surveys, was warned to abandon the area immediately or risk being intercepted by the Turkish military air force. Following the approach of two Turkish F-16 aircraft at a distance of only a few nautical miles, the Israeli aircraft was forced to land at Larnaca airport.

Similarly, on 3 April 2014, a helicopter of the Cypriot National Guard conducting its daily, routine flight over the area of Mansoura, in the north-western part of the island, was initially warned via radio calls and subsequently approached by two Turkish F-16 aircraft.

These actions constitute further attempts to upgrade the so-called "TRNC" by illegally establishing the division of Cyprus's national airspace and the Nicosia FIR, in defiance of international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, these illegal practices pose serious threats to air safety and navigation, and needlessly create additional tension at a particularly sensitive time for the negotiation process.

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In the light of the above, Turkey should be called upon, once more, to respect international legality, cease all violations and refrain from the harassment of aircraft within the Nicosia FIR.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 42, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nicholas **Emiliou**

United Nations S/2014/273

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 April 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 11 April 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group[1] (ACT Group), a cross-regional group of 23 States that advocates for greater accountability, coherence and transparency on the part of the Security Council, I would like to warmly welcome the initiative of your Presidency to address the prevention of and the fight against genocide on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda.

The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group understands that the meeting of the Security Council on the theme "Threat to international peace and security: prevention and fight against genocide" is scheduled for 16 April 2014 and will be held in the format of a briefing where only Council members will speak.

The prevention of and fight against genocide is a topic of great interest and importance, not only to members of the Security Council, but to the broader international community. The wider membership of the United Nations, and indeed the Council, would benefit from the inclusive and active participation of Member States on 16 April. For these reasons, and because the commemoration of the twentieth anniversary marks events of such seminal importance, the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group strongly encourages you to amend the currently envisaged briefing format and instead to hold an open debate on 16 April.

The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group is looking forward to further opportunities to engage constructively with Security Council members to support collective efforts in improving working methods.

I kindly ask you to circulate the present letter to the members of the Security Council and to issue it as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Olivier **Zehnder**
Chargé d'affaires a.i

[1] The members of the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency Group are Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Republic of Tanzania and Uruguay.

14-30070 (E) 160414

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United Nations S/2014/274

Security Council

Distr.: General
16 April 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 11 April 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you a letter from the Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition to the United Nations, dated 11 April, in relation to the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) on the elimination of chemical weapons programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Levent **Eler**
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

14-30276 (E) 210414

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Annex to the letter dated 11 April 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the people of Syria and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, it is my grave responsibility to draw to your attention the Syrian regime's repeated failure to effectively implement Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the ongoing need for conclusive verification by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Mission to ensure the full and complete destruction of all Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities.

In adopting Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), the Security Council unanimously endorsed the decision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council of 27 September 2013, which contains special procedures both for the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as the stringent verification thereof. As the Security Council determined, "the use of chemical weapons anywhere constitutes a threat to international peace and security" (see Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), para. 1).

There is, however, significant reason to believe that the Syrian regime has continued to maintain and deploy illicit chemical weapons in the aftermath of the adoption of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). Just last month, on 27 March 2014, regime forces were reported to have deployed chemical weapons in Harasta, a suburb of Damascus. According to doctors and surgeons present following the attacks, at least 25 people were treated for symptoms ranging from hallucination, accelerated pulse, difficulty breathing and, in several cases, suffocation.

The Syrian regime's possible use of chemical weapons demonstrates the urgent need for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission to maintain vigilance in ensuring that all of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities are destroyed. Yet that will only be possible once all sites and stockpiles have been fully declared. It remains unclear whether that is the case.

To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), stringent verification and due diligence by the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission are required throughout the oncoming months. As an initial step, the Joint Mission should send without delay a monitoring and inspection team to the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre's facility in Jamraya, which has played an instrumental role in Syria's chemical weapons production, storage and deployment. Such a mission will allow OPCW-United Nations monitors to gain a more thorough accounting of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles and any illicit weapons that may not have been declared by regime authorities.

Both the Syrian Coalition and the Free Syrian Army remain committed to the full, immediate and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The Interim Defense Ministry has publicly confirmed the Free Syrian Army's commitment not to attack convoys on routes used to transfer chemical weapons for delivery to the United Nations. To ensure that we are fully able to assist in its implementation, however, the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission must engage more transparently with our members. Improved methods of communication with the Joint Mission will ensure that the Free Syrian Army is better able to

guarantee the safety of chemical weapons convoys and assist effectively in the elimination of Syria's illegal chemical weapons stockpile.

A particular problem remains our lack of clarity regarding the nature of Syrian convoys. At present, it is impossible for Free Syrian Army brigades to distinguish between regime disposal convoys versus regime military convoys. It is therefore essential that the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission provide the Syrian Coalition and its partner, the Free Syrian Army, with precise information on the schedule and routes of all convoys deployed through opposition-held territories. Such information will enable our partners on the ground to better support the safe passage of chemical weapons convoys.

The elimination of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal is an important and worthy goal. Yet, it will not end the Syrian crisis. While the Syrian regime distracts and delays in the implementation of Security Council resolution 2118 (2013), it proceeds undaunted in its deployment of barrel bombs, cluster munitions and ballistic missiles. These weapons — conventional weapons — account for more than 99 per cent of all deaths in the past three years. Members of the Security Council have within their power the mandate not merely to condemn the brutal and illegal deployment of conventional weapons by regime forces, but to stop it. To do so, further pressure by the Security Council is urgently needed to draw this conflict to a close and compel the Syrian regime to negotiate and agree on the establishment of a transitional governing body to pave the path to democracy, as mandated by the Geneva Communiqué of June 2012, as well as by Security Council resolution 2118 (2013). The people of Syria remain committed to such a transition, as does the Syrian Coalition.

(*Signed*) Najib **Ghadbian**
Special Representative of the Syrian Coalition
to the United Nations

United Nations S/2014/275

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 April 2014

Original: English

Letter dated 15 April 2014 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a note verbale dated 4 April 2014 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

[Original: French]

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic.

Pursuant to paragraph 50 of the resolution, the Permanent Mission of France transmits herewith the second report on the operational activities of the French force Sangaris deployed in the Central African Republic, along with a table of the joint operations undertaken with the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA).

The Permanent Mission would be grateful if the Secretary-General would bring these documents to the attention of the Security Council.

Enclosure

Second report on Operation Sangaris

Support to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic in the discharge of its mandate

22 March 2014

1. Basis of the support to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA)

- Security council resolution 2127 (2013) of 5 December 2013 authorizes the French forces in the Central African Republic, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, and for a temporary period, to take all necessary measures to support MISCA in the discharge of its mandate.

2. Generic actions undertaken by the Sangaris force

- France's operational actions are guided by respect for human rights and international conventions. When faced with situations of abuse and human rights violations, the Sangaris force takes a firm stand. The French troops deployed have received clear instructions: they are to intervene as quickly as possible to end the abuse.
- In the implementation of confidence-building measures, since 9 December, the Sangaris force has been supporting MISCA by implementing and overseeing measures for the disarming and barracking of armed groups in its areas of deployment.
- MISCA and Operation Sangaris have contributed to the barracking of the ex-Seleka at several sites in Bangui and have participated in the disarming of the anti-balaka in Bangui and in western Central African Republic. Since December, they have also seized nearly 1,200 military weapons and large quantities of ammunition in the process of disarming ex-Seleka and anti-balaka elements in an impartial manner.
- These actions have been carried out jointly in Bangui and the western part of the country in order to extend the area control actions. During these missions, each time that it witnessed abuses, the Sangaris force intervened to prevent or put an end to the abuses it witnessed, in particular by firing warning shots.
- The Sangaris force also supports MISCA in protecting the people on a daily basis, not only in Bangui, but also in the provinces, including in Boda, Carnot, Berberati, Bouar, Yaloke and Bossembele, where the French forces acting jointly with MISCA have prevented abuses and even used force to put an end to them.
- The joint Sangaris-MISCA action played a major part in the resumption of vehicle traffic on the main east-west road between Bangui and Garoua Boulaï on the border with Cameroon (also known as the main supply route (MSR)). The many convoy escorts provided have enabled Bangui to be resupplied on an ongoing basis, which is contributing to some economic recovery.

- Access to humanitarian assistance is also being facilitated by the ongoing joint action by the Sangaris force and MISCA.

3. Substantive support provided to MISCA

- Seven French officers have been integrated into MISCA headquarters on an ongoing basis; one gendarmerie officer is an adviser to the Commander of the police component; one officer is an adviser to the MISCA Force Commander.
- In Bangui, two tactical liaison detachments provided by the Savoie combined arms battle group (the French battalion assigned to the city) coordinate joint missions with the Burundian and Rwandan battalions.
- On a daily basis, support to MISCA also takes the form of advising on the restructuring of units, the organization of command and planning for operations. Military intelligence is shared between the leaderships of the two forces.
- The French and MISCA force commanders interact in a unified manner with the Transitional Authorities on a regular basis to coordinate their joint actions. The general staff of the two forces meet every two weeks for that purpose.
- Patrols and operations are also planned and conducted jointly on a regular basis, whether in Bangui or in outlying regions. In recent weeks the focus has been on the main supply road leading from the capital to the border with Cameroon and on certain districts in Bangui. Nearly 90 joint patrols have been carried out in the last two months.
- In the area of logistics, France has supplied MISCA with six trucks and one trailer (bringing to 54 the number of French vehicles held by MISCA) while also providing support for them from M'poko.
- France has also supported MISCA deployment to outlying regions, which is currently 90 per cent complete.
- The next stage will be to assist MISCA as it deploys to the east (Ippy for the Gabonese contingent and Bria for the contingent from the Democratic Republic of the Congo).
- Lastly, in terms of medical support, the Sangaris force conducted four surgeries and provided paramedical assistance in 147 cases for MISCA in the last two months. Four patients were also evacuated by France to Libreville.

Ad hoc joint operations of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic and the Sangaris force, February-March 2014

Date	*Type of operation*	*Mission*	*MISCA Sangaris resources involved*
31 January-1 February 2014	Operation Goumbiri	Recapture of Sibut and installation of two MISCA companies	1 Sangaris combined arms sub-battle group as support 2 companies (1 Rwandan; 1 Congolese)
Since 4 February	Operation Kamou	Relief of Sangaris in M'Baïki for area control in Boda	1 Congolese company and 1 tactical general staff
1-2 February 2014	Operation Gazao	Action at Office central de répression du banditisme (OCRB) anti-balaka sites and in Ouango	1 Formed Police Unit platoon; 1 MISCA company from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 1 Rwandan MISCA company
8-12 February 2014	Moki	Reconnaissance of Berberati airfield	210 troops (130 Cameroonian and 80 Gabonese) deployed in Bouar; 47 Gabonese troops deployed in Baoro; 40 Cameroonian troops deployed in Beloko; 34 Cameroonian troops moving to Berberati (expected to arrive on 7 February)
14 February 2014	Tizi II	Securing perimeter of Bafio area (district 4) to support a formed poiice unit operation	1 Burundian battalion; 1 Rwandan battalion; 1 task force; 1 crowd control platoon (size 1 platoon reinforced by 1 armoured vehicle, 1 judicial police pool (1 coordinator and 3 x 2 judicial police officers inserted into MISCA sections — 1 command team)); 1 formed police unit (2 platoons) from M'Poko during working hours and from barracks during non-working hours; 1 formed police unit (2 platoons) as quick reaction force

Date	*Type of operation*	*Mission*	*MISCA/Sangaris resources involved*
18 February 2014	Yokpo II	Reconnoitring situation in Bossangoa	1 Chadian MISCA company
12 February 2014	Mpoko II	Visit by Minister of Defence	Securing of Bangui by Rwandan and Burundian MISCA company and of the Congolese section at M'Baio
27 February 2014	Mpoko III	Visit by high-level officials	3 Rwandan sections; 4 Formed police unit platoons; 2 companies from the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 1 Burundian section
3 March 2014 ongoing	Batouri II	Escorting civilian convoys on main supply route	Support for MISCA control action in towns; joint escorts from a group to a Cameroonian or Congolese section
18 February 2014	Tizi IV	Securing perimeter of Edville district (district 8) to support a MISCA operation	2 MISCA companies (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundian) and 1 formed police unit
26 March-25 April 2014	Ouara	Redeployment of the force with emphasis on the east	1 Chadian company relieved by 1 Congolese company in Bambari

Ongoing joint operations of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic and the Sangaris force, February-March 2014

Date	*Type of operation*	*Missions*	*MISCA/Sangaris resources involved*
5 February 2014	Operation Amba	Transport of funds; securing of Bangui by Sangaris force and MISCA	Resources of 1 Rwandan section and/or 1 Burundian section
3 February-10 March 2014	Operation Batouri	Deployment of Panther combined arms battle group to the west; MISCA installed at Boali, Berberati, Carnot and Nola	1 Congolese company at Boali; 1 Cameroonian section at Carnot; 1 Cameroonian section at Berberati; 2 Congolese sections at Nola

Joint patrols by the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic and the Sangaris force, February-March 2014: 89 section-level patrols

Date	*Type of patrol*	*Sangaris unit*	*Place*
1 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
2 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
3 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
4 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
5 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
6 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
6 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
7 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
8 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
9 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
10 February 2014	Joint French-Chadian patrol	Panther	Bossangoa region
17 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/ police/gendarmerie patrol	Panther	Berberati
18 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/ police/gendarmerie patrol	Panther	Berberati
19 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/ police/gendarmerie patrol	Panther	Berberati/Carnot
20 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/ police/gendarmerie patrol	Panther	Berberati/Carnot
20 February 2014	1500 hours: Atila 1 — PK5 patrol Burundian MISCA and contact with Congolese MISCA command point	Amarante	Bangui
21 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Berberati/Carnot
23 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
24 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
24 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
24 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar

Date	*Type of patrol*	*Sangaris unit*	*Place*
25 February 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Baoro
25 February 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Bouar
25 February 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité /MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Carnot
26 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
26 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
26 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
27 February 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Baoro
27 February 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Bouar
27 February 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Carnot
28 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
28 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
28 February 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
1 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
1 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
1 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
2 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
2 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
2 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
3 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
3 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
3 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
4 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
4 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
4 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar

Date	*Type of patrol*	*Sangaris unit*	*Place*
5 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
5 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
5 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
6 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/ Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
6 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
6 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
6 March 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Baboua/Beloko
7 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA/ Forces de défense et de sécurité patrol	Panther	Carnot
7 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Baoro
7 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Panther	Bouar
7 March 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Baboua/Beloko
8 March 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Baoro
8 March 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Bouar
8 March 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Baboua/Beloko
8 March 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Panther	Carnot
5 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Dragon	Baoro
5 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Dragon	Bouar
6 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Dragon	Baoro
6 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Dragon	Bouar
6 March 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Baboua/Beloko
7 March 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Carnot
7 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Dragon	Bouar
7 March 2014	2 joint Sangaris/MISCA dismounted patrols (1000 hours and 1400 hours) in Cantonnier region	Dragon	Beloko/Cantonnier

Date	*Type of patrol*	*Sangaris unit*	*Place*
8 March 2014	2 dismounted patrols with MISCA (1000 and 1600) for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko
8 and 9 March 2014	1 joint night patrol with random checkpoint set up from 1900A to 2130A; 1 joint night patrol with random checkpoint set up from 0400A to 0600A	Dragon	Yaloke
9 March 2014	Violet 30/1 joint night patrol with random checkpoint set up from 1900A to 2100A	Dragon	Yaloke
9 March 2014	Violet 30/1 joint night patrol with random checkpoint set up from 0000A to 0200A	Dragon	Yaloke
9 March 2014	Joint Sangaris/MISCA patrol	Dragon	Bouar
9 March 2014	Joint MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Beloko/Cantonnier
9 March 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Carnot
10 March 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Beloko
10 March 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Carnot
10 March 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Beloko
11 March 2014	Joint Forces de défense et de sécurité/MISCA/Sangaris patrol	Dragon	Beloko
11 March 2014	Joint patrol of main supply route in Yaloke and Bossenforo region	Dragon	Yaloke and Bossenforo region
12 March 2014	Two dismounted patrols with MISCA at 1000A and 1500A for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko
13 March 2014	Two dismounted patrols with MISCA for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko
14 March 2014	Two dismounted patrols with MISCA for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko

Date	*Type of patrol*	*Sangaris unit*	*Place*
15 March 2014	One dismounted patrol with MISCA for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko
16 March 2014	One dismounted patrol with MISCA for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko
17 March 2014	One dismounted patrol with MISCA for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko
19 March 2014	Two dismounted patrols with MISCA (at 0900 and 1700 A) for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko
20 March 2014	Two dismounted patrols with MISCA for confidence-building measures and intelligence-gathering on population	Dragon	Beloko

Health support provided to the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic by the Sangaris force, February-March 2014

Date	*Type of support*	*Place*	*Sangaris resources involved*
	Emergency consultations — 4		
	Surgical consultations — 5		
	Paramedical assistance — 147		
	Patients hospitalized — 4		
	Days of hospitalization — 7		
	Surgeries — 4		
	Number of X-rays — 9		
	Number of ultrasounds — 5		
	Number of laboratory tests — 11		
	No health support during joint operations		
	4 patients evacuated by CASA "Nurse" aircraft to Libreville		